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THERE'S MADNESS IN THE METHOD: A
COMMENTARY ON LAW, STATISTICS, AND THE
NATURE OF LEGAL EDUCATION
STEVEN B. Dow*
Judges commonly are elderly men, and are more likely to hate at
sight any analysis to which they are not accustomed, and which
disturbs repose of mind ....
- Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'
Introduction
Professional legal education is unique among all of the university graduate-
level programs in the natural and social sciences in not requiring at least a
basic level of competency in statistics and quantitative methods. As these
other disciplines are becoming more quantitative, the dominant paradigm in
legal education remains largely unchanged. To understand the reason for this
puzzling situation and see its implications for law, we must start by looking
at the history of legal education.
A little over a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., then a justice on the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, opined that the lawyer of the future
would be skilled in "statistics and the master of economics."2 Holmes was
commenting on the state of legal education, dominated at that time by Harvard
Law School. Holmes's remark was a not-so-thinly-veiled attack on the
leading figure in legal education, Christopher Columbus Langdell, and the
educational system he had established at Harvard.
Langdell, dean of the law school from 1870 to 1895,' was responsible for
shaping legal education at Harvard. Not only was Harvard the first university-
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1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 230 (1921); see also
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COURT DECISIONS 15 (1998).
2. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897);
see also WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 13 (1973)
(discussing the skills which lawyers of the future will possess).
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affiliated law school,4 but it was also the most influential law school, setting
the trend for professional legal education throughout the United States.5
The nature of legal education at Langdell's Harvard is not merely a matter
of historical interest; it is pertinent to this Commentary because not only did
Harvard set the trend for legal education in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, but the fundamentals of legal education have changed
very little over the intervening century.6 Therefore, understanding the history
of legal education at Harvard is crucial to understanding the nature of
contemporary legal education.
Langdell and the Origins of American Legal Education
Before the rapid growth of American law schools during the second half of
the nineteenth century, aspiring lawyers mainly were educated through an
apprentice system.7 Under this system, a practicing lawyer would accept a
young man as an apprentice, who would then assist the lawyer and study the
law for a fairly brief period before going out to practice law on his own.8 The
first law schools grew out of this arrangement. They were small, privately run
businesses, not affiliated with universities.9 On the eve of the Civil War, only
twenty-one law schools existed in the United States.'0 By the time Langdell
became dean of Harvard Law School in 1870, the number had grown to thirty-
one.
1'
Langdell set out to radically change the nature of legal education. He was
influenced by two things. The first was the growth and success of the natural
sciences in the nineteenth century and their prestige both within and outside
of universities.' 2 He endeavored to emulate this success by establishing the
study of law as a "science" in the hope of promoting the legitimacy of legal
study in the eyes of the university community, which was suspicious of law
4. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORYOFAMERICAN LAW 322 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter
FRIEDMAN, HISTORY]; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 33
(2003) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY].
5. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 321-22; HALL, supra note 3, at 219; TWINING,
supra note 2, at 10.
6. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 322; TWINING, supra note 2, at 10; see also
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton
& Howard Gillman eds., 1999); infra notes 67-72, 83-89 and accompanying text.
7. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 318,322, 606; FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY,
supra note 4, at 33; HALL, supra note 3, at 218.
8. HALL, supra note 3, at 218.
9. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 320.
10. Id. at 607.
11. Id. at 318-22, 607.
12. HALL, supra note 3, at 220.
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schools' "trade school" origins. 3  The second influence was legal
formalism - also referred to as doctrinalism - a common law theory that
dominated the second half of the nineteenth century.' 4 Under formalism, the
common law consisted of a systematic, eternal array of broad principles and
specific doctrines, all interconnected and logically consistent.' 5  These
doctrines were discovered - not made - by judges through the study of
judicial decisions and a process of inductive reasoning. Joseph Vining
described this view as "projecting an image of law as a set of rules outside, a
grid that, could you only tap it with your fingernail, would give out a hard
metallic ring."' 6 These principles and doctrines could then be applied through
a process of syllogistic reasoning to resolve current legal questions. 7 This
view of law was manifested in the nature of legal education that Langdell
developed and promoted at Harvard. His goal was to convert the study of
these principles and doctrines into a science and establish it as the paradigm
for training law students.' 8
Several features of Langdell's system are particularly relevant for
understanding the notable absence of statistics and other aspects of
quantitative methodology in legal education. First, Langdell' s understanding
of "science," at least in the context of the law, was very peculiar - perhaps
even medieval - in its beliefs and practices. Langdell's science was devoid
of experimentation.' 9 Indeed, Langdell made no mention of it in his speeches
20or writings. Instead, the locus of activity for this legal science was the law
library. In a speech given at Harvard, he stated that
[w]e have also constantly inculcated the idea that the library is the
proper workshop of [law] professors and students alike; that it is
to us all that the laboratories of the university are to the chemists
and physicists, all that the museum of natural history is to the
zoologists, all that the botanical garden is to the botanists. 2'
13. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 613; FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra
note 4, at 36; GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977); HALL, supra note 3,
at 220; NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW FROM POSNER
TO POST-MODERNISM 7 (1997); TWINING, supra note 2, at 12; David M. Trubek, Where the
Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575, 584 (1984).
14. GILMORE, supra note 13, at 42-48.
15. Id. at 43, 62; HALL, supra note 3, at 220.
16. ROBERT POST, LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE vii (1991).
17. EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE: THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW
95 (Harvard Univ. Press 1976) (1974); MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 13, at 7-8.
18. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 13, at 7.
19. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 617.
20. TWINING, supra note 2, at 12.
21. Id.; GILMORE, supra note 13, at 47. This is the same position taken by the American
20041
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The subject of this "scientific" study was reported judicial decisions.22 Over
the course of several centuries, practicing lawyers and then governmental
entities had developed a practice of collecting and publishing these decisions
in bound volumes, which were eventually housed in law libraries. Although
U.S. appellate court decisions were not systematically reported until the
American Revolution, 2' a system of regular reporting on both the federal and
state levels had developed by the beginning of the nineteenth century. 24 By
1847, all of the states existing at that time had reporting systems.25
The purpose of studying these decisions was not the study of judicial
behavior in an empirical sense, but to discover the principles and doctrines of
the common law.26 In Langdell's view, through the careful study of judicial
decisions and after an appropriate amount of training, a law student could
discover legal doctrines and their underlying principles. Langdell
accomplished this training through the casebook method, which he established
Law Institute after World War II. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 212 (1995).
22. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 613, 617; MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 13,
at 7; TWINING, supra note 2, at 11.
23. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 323.
24. Id. at 324.
25. Id. at 323; GILMORE, supra note 13, at 23.
26. TWINING, supra note 2, at 12; John Henry Schlegel, Langdell's Legacy, or the Case of
the Empty Envelope, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1517 (1984); Trubek, supra note 13, at 582.
In a controversial article published in 2003, Lee Epstein and Gary King argued that
conventional legal scholarship is empirical in the sense that it purports to tell the reader
something about the world. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, Empirical Research and the Goals
of Legal Scholarship: The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHu. L. REv. 1 (2002). The problem with
such scholarship, they contend, is that nearly all of it is "deeply flawed." Id. at 6. For critiques
of this characterization see, for example, Frank Cross et al., Empirical Research and the Goals
of Legal Scholarship: Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135
(2002); Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal
Scholarship: Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (2002);
Richard L. Revesz, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: A Defense of
Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CH. L. REV. 169 (2002). Epstein and King are probably
correct with respect to contemporary legal scholarship; that is, with some notable exceptions,
it is deeply flawed empirical scholarship. Schlegel describes contemporary legal analysis as
"data-free social science." SCHLEGEL, supra note 21, at 215. Even under Epstein and King's
broad view of "empirical," there is considerable doubt that Langdell's formalism was empirical.
After all, Langdell was seeking something that transcended reality. To be sure, the judges'
articulation of these rules is a factual matter, but Langdell was not searching for the rules
articulated by judges. If he were, he would not have ignored so many reported U.S. decisions.
In this respect, Langdell's formalism is similar to theology, which is the essence of Holmes's
remark that Langdell was "the greatest living legal theologian." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 424 n.2 (1990) (quoting 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880)).
[Vol. 57:579
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and systematized at Harvard to replace the lecture and textbook methods of
instruction.
Under the casebook system, the common law principles and doctrines were
categorized into subjects such as contracts, property, and torts. Casebook
authors arranged selected decisions on a particular subject in a casebook in
chronological order so that students could learn the various principles and
doctrines and how they had evolved. Notably, legal education continues to be
structured around these same doctrinal subject categories, particularly in the
first-year curriculum.
28
Even on its own doctrinal terms, Langdell's system was problematic from
an empirical standpoint. The selection of cases was not based on systematic,
empirical observation of courts.29 For example, in Langdell's casebook on
contract law, over half of the cases were English.3° Thus, American students
studying contract law in U.S. law schools were studying primarily English
law - a puzzling incongruity considering that most of these students would
practice law in U.S. courts. Langdell's heavy use of English cases did not
result from a dearth of American cases. The decisions of most American
appellate judges had been reported since the early nineteenth century, leading
to the conclusion that there were a sufficient number of American cases from
which to choose.3 Langdell, however, had his students predominately read
English cases because the English judges did a better job of getting it right.
The "it" was the common law of contracts - that elaborate system of
doctrines and principles that Langdell was trying to impart to students. In
Langdell's view, it was necessary for the students to learn this doctrinal
system, not the doctrines and principles that American judges actually
employed in their decision making. Insofar as American judges got these
doctrines and principles wrong, they were to be ignored. Langdell made it
27. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 319, 612-13 (noting that Harvard used the
"textbook" method, while all other law schools used the "lecture" method); FRIEDMAN,
TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 34; HALL, supra note 3, at 220; MERCURO & MEDEMA,
supra note 13, at 7; Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE
POLTICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 30 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
28. FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 486; MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra
note 13, at 9; Richard A. Posner, Against the Law Reviews, LEGAL AFF., Nov./Dec. 2004, at 57.
29. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 617; TWINING, supra note 2, at 12.
30. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 614, 618; GILMORE, supra note 13, at 57, 59;
HALL, supra note 3, at 220. Friedman suggests that it was not unusual for courts and reporters
to cite English cases before the Civil War, even though a system of reporting had been
developing in the United States for half a century. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 325-
26; see also supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. The few U.S. cases in Langdell's
casebook were from the east and northeast. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 614.
31. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
2004] 583
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clear that the cases worth studying were "an exceedingly small proportion to
all that have been reported."32 The rest, in his view, were "useless, and worse
than useless."33 These "wrong" decisions were labeled as such because for
Langdell, they "disturbed the conceptual order" of contract law,34 those
fundamental principles and specific doctrines that he had uncovered through
his study of the cases.35 Grant Gilmore captured this idea nicely when he
wrote that for Langdell, "[t]he doctrine tests the cases, not the other way
around."36
The selectivity of Langdell's view regarding which cases were worth
reading is made even more apparent by considering another casebook he
assembled on equity pleading.37 Of all the cases he selected to include in the
book, the most recent case was fifty years old.3" These two casebook
examples, along with Langdell's own public statements, clearly illustrate that
his science of law was not the study of what American judges were, in fact,
doing in deciding the disputes brought before them. Moreover, Langdell's
method was not a study of the behavior of American judges or other actors in
the U.S. legal system. It was not even a study of the legal doctrines American
judges used in their decisions, except insofar as they "got it right." It ignored,
among other things, the great diversity that had developed among American
courts, leading many to criticize Langdell's system.
Langdell's Critics
What we see in the selection of cases is Langdell and the other casebook
authors quietly, and perhaps unknowingly, shifting from a descriptive to
normative undertaking. This approach was not without its critics, both inside
and outside Harvard, who saw Langdell's system as too theoretical.39 For
example, Holmes saw the pursuit of discovering enduring principles of law as
misguided. In his famous speech, The Path of the Law,4° he stated that "[t]he
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious,
are what I mean by the law.",4 1 Holmes's view and other early critical views,
32. CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii
(1871).
33. GILMORE, supra note 13, at 47; see also FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 614.
34. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM xii, 4 (William W. Fisher et al. eds., 1993).
35. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 13, at 8-9.
36. GILMORE, supra note 13, at 47.
37. See CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, CASES IN EQUITY PLEADING (1878).
38. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 614.
39. Id. at 617.
40. Holmes, supra note 2, at 457.
41. Id. at 461; see also AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 34, at 4.
[Vol. 57:579
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however, made little difference in the growing dominance of the Langdellian
paradigm.
Langdell' s approach to legal education is also notable for things it omitted.
As William Twining pointed out, Langdell's view of legal education "consists
solely of principles or doctrines and, in law school at least, law students
should study nothing but law."42 This meant that law students studied nothing
but principles and doctrines of the common law. The common law was "self-
contained" in the sense that it contained the answers for all legal questions,
answers which could be uncovered through careful study.43 This meant that
in searching for the law there was no need to study anything outside of the
cases, let alone outside of the law. Casebook authors omitted statutes, an
obvious and important source of law.4" In their 1993 book on legal realism,
an approach to the study of law that briefly and unsuccessfully challenged
doctrinalism during the 1920s and 1930s, William Fisher, Morton Horwitz,
and Thomas Reed neatly condensed the essence of this formalistic conception
of law:
Properly organized, law was like geometry .... Each doctrinal
field revolved around a few fundamental axioms, derived primarily
from empirical observation of how courts had in the past responded
to particular sorts of problems. From those axioms, one could and
should deduce - through uncontroversial, rationally compelling
reasoning processes - a large number of specific rules or
corollaries. The legal system of the United States, they
acknowledged, did not yet fully conform to this ideal; much of the
scholars' energies were devoted to identifying and urging the
repudiation of rules or decisions that disturbed the conceptual
order of their respective fields. But once purified of such
anomalies and errors, the scholars contended, the law would be
"complete" (capable of providing a single right answer to every
dispute) and elegant.4"
The search for principles and doctrines through the study of cases also
meant that there was no attention to fact finding, a process in which courts
were regularly engaged.46 The facts of a case were set out by the judge in the
42. TWINING, supra note 2, at 13.
43. This view has been recently defended by those in the "neotraditionalist" movement.
MERCURO&MEDEMA,supra note 13, at 7-8; POSNER, supra note 26, at 423-53; Mensch, supra
note 27, at 26, 30.
44. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 322,614, 617.
45. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 34, at xii.
46. GILMORE, supra note 13, at 60, 63.
2004]
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written decision. Langdell's lack of attention to fact finding did not go
unnoticed by his critics. John Chipman Gray argued that the study of a
substitute for the facts may be much better material for intellectual
gymnastics than the facts themselves and may call forth more
enthusiasm in the pupils, but a school where the majority of the
professors shuns and despises the contact with actual facts, has got
the seeds of ruin in it and will and ought to go to the devil.
47
The lack of attention to the fact-finding process is still a characteristic of
casebooks.
Another problem with the self-contained, self-referential, and insular nature
of law under Langdell's system was that there was no reason to look outside
of the law in search for answers to legal questions.4" Consequently, no
attention was given to the array of social, economic, and political forces that
interacted with law. In Lawrence Friedman's view, this made "Langdell's
science of law. .. a geology without rocks, an astronomy without stars. 49
The lack of attention to the facts in a case meant a lack of attention to social
facts. Accordingly, social data gathered through empirical means and the
methods of analyzing it had no part in legal education. Simply put, the
emerging social sciences - economics, psychology, political science, and
sociology - had no part in the law student's curriculum.50
Skeptics criticized the insular nature of Langdell's system. Roscoe Pound,
who held a doctorate in botany, 5' and who would serve as the dean of Harvard
Law School in the early twentieth century, 52 was especially critical of
Langdell's approach to education and his erroneous characterization of his
method as "scientific." In Pound's "sociological jurisprudence," one of
lawyers' important roles was gathering and presenting factual data on the
"social and economic consequences" of legal decisions.53 He was critical of
47. TWINING, supra note 2, at 20 (quoting Letter from John Chipman Gray, Professor,
Harvard University, to Charles William Eliot, President, Harvard University (Jan. 8, 1883)).
48. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 13, at 8.
49. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 617.
50. Id. at 322, 617; MERCURO&MEDEMA, supra note 13, at 8.
51. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 54 (1995); FRIEDMAN,
TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 489; HALL, supra note 3, at 224.
52. Pound was dean from 1916 to 1936. DUXBURY, supra note 51, at 54, 62; FRIEDMAN,
TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 489-90; HALL, supra note 3, at 224.
53. DUXBURY, supra note 51, at 58; HALL, supra note 3, at 224; GARY MINDA,
POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 26 (1995);
TWINING, supra note 2, at 23; Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal
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Langdell's system for failing to train law students to do this. Louis Brandeis
was another important critic of Langdell's method. Before being appointed
to the U.S. Supreme Court, Brandeis was influential in urging courts to
consider a variety of "extralegal" material that included an array of data on
workplace, psychological, economic, and medical conditions, a practice that
was unknown before the twentieth century. 4 Not surprisingly, this data was
absent from Langdell's method. Holmes and Benjamin Cardozo, both
influential judges, also saw the importance of social and economic facts as
well as social policy implications in legal decision making,55 all of which were
ignored by Langdell.
These critical voices failed to bring about change in Langdell's system. In
fact, as dean, Langdell endeavored to purge Harvard's faculty of anyone who
had any interest in these other disciplines and their analytical methods.56
Langdell was also successful in perpetuating his system by hiring as law
teachers mainly those who themselves were trained in the system. 7 Ephraim
Gurney, dean of faculty at Harvard and one of Langdell's critics, remarked
that Langdell's system was "breeding within itself."58 Not only had Langdell
removed faculty members who had any interest in fields outside of the law,59
he also endeavored to purge anyone who had experience in law practice.6° In
his view, "scientists," not practitioners, were needed to teach the "science" of
the law.6' Consequently, legal education was largely cut off from the
mainstream intellectual development of American universities, as well as the
practice and administration of law.
Under Landgell's method, law students studied one doctrinal topic after
another for the entire three years of school. They did not take any courses in
natural sciences, social sciences, or research methods of those sciences,
including statistics. Importantly, law school was an undergraduate program
during much of this time period.62 The schools did not require an
undergraduate degree or even any undergraduate course work for admission.63
The requirement of having a bachelor's degree before being admitted to law
54. This practice became known as a "Brandeis brief." HALL, supra note 3, at 224; see also
ERICKSON & SIMON, supra note 1, at 12-15.
55. HALL, supra note 3, at 223; MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 13, at 9.
56. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 617; HALL, supra note 3, at 220.
57. GILMORE, supra note 13, at 57.
58. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 615.
59. HALL, supra note 3, at 220.
60. FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 34.
61. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 615.
62. Id. at 608; FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 481.
63. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 608; FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra
note 4, at 481.
20041
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school started at Harvard in 1896, 4 but mainly did not come into effect until
the 1950s and 1960s.65 Consequently, law students did not receive college-
level training in any natural or social sciences, or their research methods,
before or during law school.
In light of what law students studied and how they studied it, they got along
quite well without studying statistics or other quantitative methods. Students
studied selected judicial decisions from a qualitative - but nonbehavioral -
perspective. The "facts" of a case were posited by the judge who wrote the
opinion, regardless of whether they corresponded with reality. Moreover, the
disputes that parties typically brought before the courts were seen as involving
the individual parties and little else. The larger social, economic, and political
world was excluded from the instructional process.
Notwithstanding the unempirical nature of Langdell's system, it was able
to survive within the university system. Indeed, legal education gained
intellectual legitimacy by affiliating with universities. Legal education
remained very isolated, however, with respect to the universities in which the
law schools existed, inasmuch as it developed in isolation from the natural and
social sciences and other university disciplines.66
Despite its flaws and shortcomings, Langdell's system was "firmly
established" at Harvard by the middle of his tenure as dean of the law
school.67 More importantly, Langdell's method spread to "[elvery major and
most minor law schools . "..."68 These schools fashioned their courses and
instructional method after Langdell' s model at Harvard.6 9 In some cases, this
was the result of Harvard-trained lawyers obtaining teaching positions at other
law schools.7" By 1920, Langdell's system dominated legal education in the
United States, establishing a high degree of uniformity in American legal
education.7' The rise and eventual hegemony of Langdellian orthodoxy in
American law schools during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
is remarkable, perhaps even bizarre. It is truly difficult to comprehend how
institutions that embraced an approach to legal education that was so
profoundly flawed could establish themselves as an integral part of post-
graduate education in American universities.72
64. FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 38.
65. Id. at 481.
66. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 609.
67. TWINING, supra note 2, at 13.
68. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 617.
69. Id. at 322, 616.
70. FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 34-35.
71. Id. at 34; HALL, supra note 3, at 220.
72. The focus of this commentary has been on legal education, but it should be added that
scholarship within the legal academy suffered from the same problems. Friedman observes that
[Vol. 57:579
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Law and Statistics in American Courts
Although legal education was moving away from mainstream intellectual
development in America and becoming more isolated from the universities in
which it was situated, we should consider the extent to which empirical data
and methods of analysis played a role in the activities of courts. While
American courts were never entirely separated from making public policy,
before the twentieth century the amount of empirical data inside of courts was
quite small. 73 Starting in the second half of the nineteenth century, U.S. courts
frequently found themselves involved in overt public policy making, largely
as the result of legal challenges to governmental regulation of the economy.74
Such cases inevitably involved disputes over social and economic facts, which
entailed the need for empirical data and the means to interpret it. Rosemary
Erickson and Rita Simon identified Muller v. Oregon,75 decided in 1908, as
the beginning of the use of social science data by judges in resolving legal
disputes.76 Judges used such data only sporadically over the next sixty years,
notably in cases such as Brown v. Board of Education,77 until becoming more
routine, at least in certain areas of law.78 Nearly thirty years ago, Judge
Braxton Craven suggested that providing courts with empirical data "is now
standard operating procedure [for lawyers] in equal employment, ecology, and
major school desegregation cases. 79 In the same year, Judge John Wisdom
expressed a similar view on the developing relationship between law and
social science:
What seemed at first to be antagonism between social science and
law has now developed into a love match. What began in the field
of education spread to many other fields. In case after case the
Fifth Circuit, among other courts, has relied on studies developed
by social scientists and other scientists to show pollution, unlawful
"[liegal scholarship had, since Langdell, tended to be self-centered, solipsistic, unmindful and
unaware of scholarship outside the discipline." FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note
4, at 496. On the question of whether legal scholarship has significantly changed more recently,
see infra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
73. ERICKSON & SIMON, supra note 1, at 12-15.
74. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, HISTORY, supra note 4, at 439-66; HALL, supra note 3, at chs. 5-6,
10, 12.
75. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
76. ERICKSON & SIMON, supra note 1, at 14-15.
77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78. ERICKSON & SIMON, supra note 1, at 12-18.
79. J. Braxton Craven, Jr., The Impact of Social Science Evidence on the Judge: A Personal
Comment, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 150, 151 (1975).
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exclusion of blacks from the jury system, employment
discrimination, arbitrary or discriminatory use of the death penalty,
discrimination against women, the need for reapportionment, and
the cure for malapportionment of various public bodies.8"
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's selective hostility to the use of social
science data,8 the need for and reliance on social science data has
dramatically increased since the 1970s.82
While the courts were slow to respond to the challenges created by these
cases, the legal education system totally failed to respond. Law students
failed to obtain the skills they would need as lawyers and judges to deal with
the factual and policy questions that increasingly confronted courts. Under
Langdell' s casebook system, law students were assumed to have acquired the
skills they would need for law practice. Ironically, as legal education ossified
into Langdellian formalism and turned away from social, political, and
economic perspectives, reform in the opposite direction was most needed. At
a time when law schools needed to train lawyers to integrate the various social
sciences to practice law effectively, these schools were purging their curricula
and faculties of any trace of these outside influences.
80. John Minor Wisdom, Random Remarks on the Role of Social Sciences in the Judicial
Decision-Making Process in School Desegregation Cases, 39 LAw & CONTEMAP. PROBS. 134,
142-43 (1975).
81. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); ERICKSON & SIMON, supra note
1, at 17; Donald N. Bersoff, Social Science Data and the Supreme Court: Lockhart as a Case
in Point, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 52 (1987).
82. ERICKSON & SIMON, supra note 1, at 1-2; see LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE
SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1992); MELVIN
D. KRAFr, USING EXPERTS IN CIVIL CASES (1982); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE
(1991); FAUSTE. Rossi, EXPERT WITNESS (1991); Patrick A. Driessen, The Wedding of Social
Science and the Courts: Is the Marriage Working?, 64 SOC. SCI. Q. 476 (1983); see also Nancy
E. Adleret al., Psychological Factors in Abortion, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1194 (1992); Bersoff,
supra note 81, at 52; David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989); Constance R. Lindman,
Sources of Judicial Distrust of Social Science Evidence: A Comparison of Social Science and
Jurisprudence, 64 IND. L.J. 755 (1989); John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority:
Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (1986).
J. Alexander Tanford's assessment of the trend is less sanguine. SeeJ. Alexander Tanford, The
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Legal Realism and Its Legacy
In the early part of the twentieth century, a varied group of law school
faculty known as the legal realists challenged the Langdellian model.83 Legal
realists tended to have a more activist orientation, and they sought to reform
legal education by transforming it from its medieval mentality into modem
intellectual life.8" They also attempted to make legal education more relevant
to the needs of lawyers and judges by introducing social sciences into the
curriculum and connecting the law with the real world by having students
study what judges actually do.85 The policy implications found in the
connections between law, economics, and society especially interested the
realists. 6 After the height of legal realism in the 1930s, the movement
faltered and eventually faded from the law school establishment.87 There is
some question about how much of an impact the realists had on legal
education, but one thing is certain. Within a few decades, the Langdellian
system had reestablished itself in American law schools, at least with respect
to its fundamentals.88 Accordingly, legal education retains many of the same
flaws it had in its original form.
Over a half century after Langdell, Judge Richard Posner observed that
law professors... with only a few exceptions, believed that the
only thing law students needed to study was authoritative legal
texts ... because the only essential preparation for a legal scholar,
beyond what he could be expected to bring to his work from his
college education and his general reading, was knowledge of what
was in those texts .... The only change from Langdel's day...
was that law was increasingly recognized to be a purposive
instrument of social control, so that one had to know something
83. See generally AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 34; see also FRIEDMAN,
TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 490-93; MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 13, at 10;
Heise, supra note 53, at 822; Mensch, supra note 27, at 32.
84. See sources cited supra note 83.
85. Id.
86. CLAYTON & GILLMAN, supra note 6, at 16; MERCtJRO& MEDEMA, supra note 13, at 11;
Mensch, supra note 27, at 32-33; Craig A. Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing
a Dialogue Between the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 347, 357-59
(1995); Trubek, supra note 13, at 584. A few engaged in empirical research. FRIEDMAN,
TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 490; Heise, supra note 53, at 831; Trubek, supra note
13, at 583-84.
87. Clayton and Gillman discuss why the realist orientation had little impact on professional
legal education. CLAYTON & GI.LMAN, supra note 6, at 17-20.
88. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 13, at 12; SCHLEGEL, supra note 21, at 243, 250-51;
Heise, supra note 53, at 822-24; Mensch, supra note 27, at 34-35.
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about society to be able to understand, criticize, and improve law.
But that "something" was what any intelligent person with a good
general education and common sense knew or could pick up from
the legal texts themselves ....
Clearly very little had changed in that half century, and the problems with
Langdell's system survive today in American legal education.
Legal Education Today
A number of scholars have suggested that important changes are currently
underway in the study of law. It has been, as one scholar remarked, turning
"outward." 90 These scholars have noted a recent breakdown of the idea of law
as an autonomous discipline and, at the same time, the rise in a variety of "law
& _" movements within law schools.9  Collectively, these movements
view the traditional perspective on law as deficient - Posner describes it as
"bankrupt" 92 - and are attempting to integrate into the study of law various
disciplines from both the humanities and the social sciences. 93 Perhaps the
most influential of these movements is the law and economics movement.
94
While no law and statistics movement currently exists, the use of statistics has
become part of the integration of various social science disciplines, such as
economics, into the study of law.
89. POSNER, supra note 26, at 425; Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an
Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. REv. 761 (1987) [hereinafter Posner,
Decline].
90. MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 13, at 13; Martha Minow, Law Turning Outward,
73 TELos 100 (1987). Posner marks the 1960s as the beginning of this movement. POSNER,
supra note 26, at 432.
91. FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 488; MERCURO & MEDEMA, SUpra
note 13, at 11, 13; POSNER, supra note 26, at 58; Mensch, supra note 27, at 45; Posner, Decline,
supra note 89.
92. POSNER, supra note 26, at 433.
93. FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETHCENTURY, supra note 4, at 496; POSNER, supra note 26, at 432.
For example, the movements are attempting to integrate literary theory, feminist theory, political
science, sociology, economics, and anthropology. Although these movements collectively are
attempting such an integration, individually this is not always the case. Critical Legal Studies,
which is most hostile to traditional legal education and scholarship, gives very little attention
to research (whether reading it or doing it) that would be considered empirical by most social
scientists. Trubek, supra note 13, at 618-19.
94. FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 495-96; MERCURO & MEDEMA,
supra note 13, at 12-13; POSNER, supra note 26, at 58; Mensch, supra note 27, at 47. While
law and economics may be the most influential, there is no consensus on which of the
alternative disciplinary approaches is the most suitable or useful for the study of law. MERCURO
& MEDEMA, supra note 13, at 5. Those within the neotraditional movement find that none are
suitable. POSNER, supra note 26, at 423-53.
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The Old Order Hangs On
These interdisciplinary movements in law sound very exciting; however,
all of these activities within the movements largely are confined to the
scholarly activities of a fairly small minority of faculty in the upper tiers of
law schools. These movements have brought about little, if any, changes in
the scholarly activities of other law faculty,95 and, more importantly, these
movements have brought about remarkably little change in the instructional
model, even in upper-tier law schools.96 Notably, the fundamentals of the
traditional instructional model continue to dominate legal education today.97
The format of casebooks has changed very little over the last century, and
the casebook method still dominates legal education.98 Students continue
95. POSNER, supra note 26, at 57. Friedman describes contemporary legal scholarship as
"antediluvian as ever," but acknowledges exceptions. FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra
note 4, at 493. He adds elsewhere that twentieth-century legal scholarship has remained
doctrinal. Id. at 487; see also SCHI.EGEL, supra note 21, at 253-57; Tracey E. George,
Developing A Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J.
1635, 1654 n.65 (1998); Heise, supra note 53, at 824, 828 (acknowledging that scholarship
from law faculty is still overwhelmingly doctrinal, but expressing optimism about the future of
empirical research among law school faculty); Nard, supra note 86, at 349 (noting the "lack of
empirical legal scholarship" among law faculty). Exceptions to an otherwise negative
assessment also are acknowledged by Nard. Nard, supra note 86, at 361. It should be added,
however, that there are far more law faculty calling for empirical research than actually doing
it, or teaching it. Heise, supra note 53, at 821. Admittedly, there is some evidence that legal
scholarship has changed. See generally DOUGLAS E. Lrrowrrz, POsTMODERN PHILOSOPHY AND
LAW (1997); MINDA, supra note 53; see also, e.g., Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American
Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 1241 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex
and Reason: Steps Toward a GaylegalAgenda, 102 YALEL.J. 333 (1992); Eleanor M. Fox, The
Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making: Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 554 (1986); Peter Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
2505 (1992). This development has not been without its critics. See Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34
(1992). At the same time, this trend is largely limited to the journals of the upper-tier law
schools, which are publishing an increasing amount of empirical research. Heise, supra note
53, at 825. The increase in the number of law faculty with a J.D. and a Ph.D. is another sign of
change. Id. at 825, 828.
96. CLAYTON & GmLLmAN, supra note 6, at 17; FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra
note 4, at 489, 504; HALL, supra note 3, at 220; Heise, supra note 53, at 822.
97. HALL, supra note 3, at 220; see also infra notes 98, 110, 113 and accompanying text.
98. Heise, supra note 53, at 822. To be sure, casebooks contain a larger variety of materials
than in the past. Their titles or subtitles typically contain the phrase "Cases and Materials."
Friedman opines that "[g]enerally speaking, the casebooks of the 1990s included a lot more than
cases. Typically, they bristled with notes and questions; they sometimes included excerpts from
law review articles and, occasionally, historical, philosophical, economic, or sociological
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primarily to study judicial opinions. Judicial opinions, however, can be
studied for reasons other than learning legal doctrine. Indeed, feminist and
other critical scholars study them in search for ideology.99 Morever, law and
literature scholars study judicial opinions as literary texts," while at least
some political scientists study judicial opinions as behavior.' For the most
part, however, law students study them to learn legal rules and doctrine.
10 2
Certainly these are not the transcendent rules that were sought by students
under Langdell's formalism. With legal positivism dominating the law
schools for most of the last century, 3 it is difficult to imagine that anyone
still believes in transcendent rules. Instead, the object of study is a body of
rules and principles fashioned by the courts and other authoritative sources
such as legislatures. No longer used as normative standards, the transcendent
rules have been replaced by various ethical doctrines and by an instrumental
view of law linked with an array of economic, social, and political policy
analysis. "
The fundamental problem is that an instrumental view of law linked with
economic, social, and political policy requires an understanding of the
economy, society, and the political system. In short, it requires an
understanding of facts about the world. But, these systems and the policy
material." FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 489. Polinsky emphasizes how
common it is for casebooks to contain material on an economic analysis of the book's topic,
stating that there are too many of them to survey. A. MrrCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 148 (2d ed. 1989). At the same time, however, Friedman is
discouraged:
Still, to be honest, the bulk of the material in almost all casebooks remained highly
traditional; and the students probably do little more than skim the "other stuff."
Why pay much attention to it, if it isn't really "law"? Why read it if there is no
chance it will be on the exam?
FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 489.
99. Trubek, supra note 13, at 619. Trubek acknowledges that scholars engaged in critical
studies typically have limited their study to the study of "ideology in doctrine." Id.
100. See, e.g., INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford
Levinson & Steven Mailloux eds., 1988).
101. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).
102. FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 486; SCHLEGEL, supra note 21, at
253-57.
103. Legal positivism is a theory that views law as rules posited by some authoritative
source, such as a court or legislature. MINDA, supra note 53, at 51; JEFFR G. MURPHY & JULES
L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 19 (rev. ed. 1990).
104. FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETHCENTURY, supra note 4, at 256; Mensch, supra note 27, at 35,
45; J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84
HARv. L. REv. 769 (1971). The instrumental view of law sees it as a means of carrying out
social policy and achieving other goals.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol57/iss3/4
THERE'S MADNESS IN THE METHOD
issues they entail are not yet studied in any systematic way by most law
students. Law faculty members typically have no formal graduate-level
training in any social science discipline," 5 and law students are still not
required to take courses in social sciences or their analytical methods. While
a few law schools offer a course in statistics or social science methods, no law
school requires a course in these subjects, not even at the introductory level."°
Consequently, law students who have skills in these areas acquired them
before entering law school and, therefore, with rare exceptions, these skills are
at the undergraduate level. Since the 1960s, all states require an
undergraduate degree before beginning law study,'0 7 but there is no prescribed
set of skills or knowledge for beginning law students. As a result, possession
of skills in statistics is at best randomly scattered among the law student body.
The requirement of having an undergraduate degree before beginning law
school has made legal education a graduate level program from a formal
standpoint, but there has been little change in the nature of legal education
from its late nineteenth-century origins.'08
Looking back over the twentieth century, Holmes's prediction that lawyers
of the future will be skilled in "statistics and the master of economics" was
largely wrong. °9 The need for such knowledge and skills certainly exists
now; it probably existed in Langdell's time, but the efforts to educate law
students in these disciplines remain unchanged from when Holmes wrote
those words over a century ago. Other observers have reached similar
conclusions. Cornell Clayton and Howard Gillman suggest that
precedent, stare decisis, and formalism continue to be the way
most law students experience law and the way judges describe
what they do in written opinions. With the exception of the
occasional course injurisprudence and the occasional statement of
"judicial candor," the law school curriculum and judicial opinions
105. Heise, supra note 53, at 828.
106. Nard, supra note 86, at 365.
107. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
108. Martha Minow's observation of the law "turning outward" is surely a commentary on
legal scholarship, not legal education. Minow, supra note 90, at 100.
109. Michael Heise characterizes Holmes's prediction as being "correct." Heise, supra note
53, at 820. Perhaps Heise's error is because of his misunderstanding of Holmes's prediction.
Contrary to Heise characterizing the prediction as one "about the future influence of the 'man
of statistics' on the law," Holmes predicted that future lawyers would be skilled in statistics, as
well as masters of economics. Heise correctly saw that the use of statistics has influenced the
law's development, at least to some extent, but was absolutely wrong in suggesting that lawyers
as a group are skilled in statistics.
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continue to rely on a fairly traditional "legal model" to explain the
craft of law. I" °
Clayton and Gillman acknowledge the "law & 9_"movements, but they add
that there is "still little evidence that . . . [these new movements] have
significantly altered law school curricula or judicial opinion writing.""' In
their view these various movements
have all remained remarkably compartmentalized within the legal
academy, confined largely to discussions ofjurisprudential theory.
They are curiously detached from the processes of
professionalization and practice of the legal craft. Judges rarely
rely upon these theories in their written opinions, and legal training
continues to use rather traditional methods of case study and
doctrinal analysis to teach students how to lawyer." 2
Friedman concludes his recent assessment of twentieth-century legal research,
legal education, and legal culture by observing that the core of the "old
scholarly order" is still intact. In his view, "Students still feel, as John
Schlegel put it, 'that law is about rules."'
' 3
Statistics for Lawyers
One solution that might be considered is a book such as Statistics for
Lawyers by Michael 0. Finkelstein and Bruce Levin," 4 one of a large number
of - for Lawyers books that can be found on law library shelves.
Unfortunately, given the high level of statistics in this book and the low level
of statistical knowledge on the part of lawyers and law students, it would not
be useful or understandable for most attorneys. 15 But, even if a book like
Finkelstein and Levin's Statistics for Lawyers could succeed in teaching
statistical methods to lawyers, it would be of little value in ameliorating the
more fundamental shortcoming in legal education. The more serious problem
for most lawyers is not that they know almost nothing about statistics, but
rather that statistics and empirical data are not even "on the radar screen." In
110. CLAYTON & GIILMAN, supra note 6, at 17.
111. Id. at 39 n. 1; see also FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 489; Nard,
supra note 86, at 362.
112. CLAYTON & GI.MAN, supra note 6, at 18 (internal citation omitted).
113. FRIEDMAN, TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 4, at 504 (quoting SCHLEGEL, supra note
21, at 256). Law schools' embrace of the old order is not because of an absence of specific
reform proposals. See, e.g., Nard, supra note 86, at 365-68.
114. MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEvIN, STATISTICS rOR LAWYERS (2d ed. 2001).
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an interesting study published in The Law and Society Review, J. Alexander
Tanford shows that the problem is more profound than a basic lack of skills
in statistics.'16 Tanford explores whether and in what way the substantial
literature on the problems jurors have understanding and remembering jury
instructions, most of which is published in psychology journals, is used by
various authoritative actors in the legal system.'17 After reviewing a number
of reform efforts by appellate courts, special commissions, and legislatures," 8
Tanford concludes that the appellate courts were least likely even to consider
this literature." 9 When they did consider it, appellate judges were most likely
to make a policy change in the direction opposite from that suggested by the
literature. 2 0 In other words, judges were least likely to give any attention to
the literature, and when they did, they were unable to grasp its import. On the
other hand, legislators were most likely to reform rules relating to jury
instructions in the way suggested by the literature,' 2' even though lawyers
constituted part of the legislatures. Tanford suggests that the explanation is
found in legal culture. 2 2 Lawyers as judges do not value empirical studies or
see a need for such studies in the legal decision-making process.
2
1
This problem will not be remedied simply by teaching lawyers, or law
students, statistical methods. Rather, a new empirical orientation, along with
statistical methods, would have to be integrated throughout the law school
curriculum. This change will require nothing short of a paradigm shift,
something that has not happened in American legal education for over a
century.
Conclusion: A New Direction?
Even with the changes brought about by the law and economics movement
within American law schools, it remains to be seen whether these current
reform movements will have any lasting impact on American legal education.
There is uncertainty over whether the outcome of these movements will be any
different from the earlier ones, particularly legal realism. Over the course of
the last century, doctrinalism has proven itself to be quite resilient - some
116. J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions
Following Empirical Research on Jury Instructions, 25 LAw & Soc. REv. 155 (1991).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 158-64.
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say "impervious" - within U.S. law schools.' 24 Still, there are some signs
that the current reform movement within American law schools may in the
long run succeed in bringing about significant change. The courts are now
much more receptive to, if not insistent on, social science data than they were
forty years ago. 12' This puts pressure on lawyers - and aspiring lawyers -
as advocates to obtain the necessary empirical and quantitative skills to
provide this data.
Additionally, an increasing number of law faculty are calling for more
empirical research from their colleagues.' 26 A smaller, but growing number
of law faculty are actually producing such research, however flawed. 27 The
task of integrating social science perspectives with the traditional doctrinal
perspective will be difficult, but not insurmountable. Except for the most
narrow-minded behavioralists,' 2' social scientists who study law have been
moving in exactly this sort of interdisciplinary direction for quite some
time." 9 The unique challenge for law faculty is to develop an instructional
paradigm for students who will be primarily consumers rather than producers
of empirical research and, at the same time, accommodate the need for
professionally mandated competencies in such things as doctrinal analysis,
client counseling, and advocacy. 3° In this regard, the most suitable
instructional model may not be a social science Ph.D. program because the
graduate students in such programs typically are learning to do the same kind
of scholarly activity as the faculty members. In this sense the mission of a law
124. CLAYTON & GILLMAN, supra note 6, at 17. The hostility of law school faculty to the
"law and society" movement, which has lessened slightly over the last few years as more law
faculty havejoined the movement, provides additional evidence that reform is quite problematic.
Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REv. 763 (1986); Nard,
supra note 86, at 359-60, 364-65.
125. See supra notes 53-54, 77-82 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 26, 90-97 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., SEGAL& SPAETH, supra note 101.
129. This movement is exemplified by Marc Galanter's seminal article, Why the 'Haves'
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW& SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974),
as well as by the recent "new institutionalist" approaches to the study of judicial decision
making, see, e.g., CLAYTON & GILLMAN, supra note 6.
130. See generally SCHLEGEL, supra note 21, at ch. 5. Clayton and Gillman suggest that law
schools' "core function" of training legal practitioners is the reason that the schools resisted the
more empirical and eclectic study of law that was flourishing in social science (especially
political science) departments following World War H. CLAYTON & GItiMAN, supra note 6, at
17, 19. The realist critique had so little influence on legal education because of the perception
that it was at odds with what judges and lawyers were doing. Now that judges have a much
stronger orientation toward social science data and methods, professional legal training is
compatible with - in fact, requires - a similar shift in orientation.
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school is very different from that of a Ph.D. program. Instead, the most
suitable instructional model may be master's level programs in subjects such
as public administration and business administration, where students are
trained to be primarily consumers rather than producers of empirical research.
Law school faculty who advocate integrating social science research and data
into legal education should look to these programs for guidance in fashioning
a new instructional paradigm.
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